

2026 Rule of Law Report - targeted stakeholder consultation

Fields marked with * are mandatory.

Introduction

The annual Rule of Law Report lies at the centre of the Annual Rule of Law Cycle, which acts as a preventive tool, deepening multilateral dialogue and joint awareness of rule of law issues. So far, six editions of the Rule of Law Report have been published since 2020.

As every year, the Commission would like to invite the stakeholders to provide contributions to the 2026 Rule of Law Report. On the basis of these contributions and on-going developments, further targeted questions may be shared at a later stage of preparation of the 2026 Rule of Law Report, in particular in the context of country visits, or bilateral contacts.

The Commission invites stakeholders to provide contributions which include:

- (1) developments and measures taken in relation to the recommendations in the 2025 report,**
- (2) developments related to topics covered in the 2025 country chapters, as well as any other new developments related to the rule of law.**

The input should consist of a short summary, if possible in English, covering the areas referred to below. Legislation or other documents may be referenced with a link. Contributions should focus on significant developments since the last Rule of Law Report both as regards the legal framework and its implementation in practice.

This questionnaire also integrates the separate questionnaire on the single market from last year. In addition to these specific questions, respondents to the questionnaire are invited to consider the Single Market dimension, including any relevant cross-border issues, in all their answers.

Where questions of particular relevance under the single market dimension, this is indicated before the relevant question.

[1] Unless the information was already submitted in the input for the previous Rule of Law Reports.

Type of information to be included:

Under each of the four pillars, the replies should include references to the following types of information:

A) Legislative developments

- Newly adopted legislation
- legislative drafts currently discussed in Parliament
- legislative plans envisaged by the Government

B) Policy developments

- Implementation and enforcement of legislation
- evaluations, impact assessment, surveys
- white papers/strategies/actions plans/consultation processes
- follow-up to reports/recommendations of Council of Europe bodies or other international organisations
- important administrative measures
- generalised practices

C) Developments related to the judiciary / independent authorities

- important case law by national courts
- important decision/opinions from independent bodies/authorities
- state of play on terms, nominations and expired mandates for high-level positions (e.g. Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, Council for the Judiciary, Prosecutor General, heads of independent authorities included in the scope of the request for input[2])

D) Any other relevant developments

- National authorities are free to add any further information, which they deem relevant; however, this should be short and to the point.

Where relevant, please also indicate whether the developments reported are linked to the implementation of reforms and investments under the national Recovery Resilience Plan. To simplify your answers to the questionnaire, if there are no developments, it is sufficient to indicate this and the information covered in the contributions for the previous Rule of Law Reports does not need not be repeated.

[2] Such as: media regulatory authorities and bodies, national human rights institutions, equality bodies, ombudsman institutions, supreme audit institutions and, where they exist, transparency authorities.

* I am giving my contribution as

- ☐ Academic/research institution
- ☐ Business association
- ☒ Civil society organisation/NGO
- ☐ International organisation
- ☐ Judicial association or network
- ☐ Media organisation or association
- ☐ Public authority or network of public authorities
- ☐ Other

* Organisation name

250 character(s) maximum

Társaság a Szabadságjogokért - TASZ (Hungarian Civil Liberties Union - HCLU)

Main Areas of Work

- ☐ Justice System
- ☐ Anti-corruption
- ☒ Media Pluralism and Freedom
- ☐ Checks and Balances
- ☐ Other

Please insert an URL towards your organisation's main online presence or describe your organisation briefly:

500 character(s) maximum

<https://tasz.hu/>

Transparency register number

Check if your organisation is in the transparency register. It's a voluntary database for organisations seeking to influence EU decision-making

088667934874-58

* Country of origin

Please indicate the country of origin of your organisation

- ☐ Austria

- ☐ Belgium
- ☐ Bulgaria
- ☐ Croatia
- ☐ Cyprus
- ☐ Czechia
- ☐ Denmark
- ☐ Estonia
- ☐ Finland
- ☐ France
- ☐ Germany
- ☐ Greece
- ☒ Hungary
- ☐ Ireland
- ☐ Italy
- ☐ Latvia
- ☐ Lithuania
- ☐ Luxembourg
- ☐ Malta
- ☐ Netherlands
- ☐ Poland
- ☐ Portugal
- ☐ Romania
- ☐ Slovak Republic
- ☐ Slovenia
- ☐ Spain
- ☐ Sweden
- ☐ Other - please specify

First name

Máté

Surname

Szabó

Email Address of the organisation

tasz@tasz.hu

* Publication of your contribution and privacy settings

You can choose whether you wish for your contribution to be published and whether you wish your details to be made public or to remain anonymous.

- ☐ Anonymous - Only your type of respondent, country of origin and contribution will be published. Organisation name, URL, transparency register number, first name and surname given above will not be published. **To maintain anonymity, please refrain from mentioning the name of your organisation and any details from which your organisation can be identified in the rest of your contribution as we will not be able to guarantee anonymisation of these elements.**
- ☒ Public - Your personal details (name, organisation name, transparency register number, country of origin will be published with your contribution).
- ☐ No publication - Your contribution will not be published. Elements of your contribution may be referred to anonymously in documents produced by the Commission based on this consultation.

☒ I agree with the personal data protection provisions.

[Specific privacy statement targeted stakeholder consultation 2026 rule of law report.pdf](#)

Questions on horizontal developments

In this section, you are invited to provide information on general horizontal developments or trends, both positive and negative, covering all or several Member States. In particular, you could mention issues that are common to several Member States, as well as best practices identified in one Member State that could be replicated. Moreover, you could refer to your activities in the area of the four pillars and sub-topics (an overview of all sub-topics can be found below), and, if you represent a Network of national organisations, to the support you might have provided to one of your national members.

Overview topics for contribution

[List of topics for contribution.docx](#)

Please provide any relevant information on horizontal developments here

5000 character(s) maximum

Questions for contribution

Under each pillar, you are invited to provide information on measures taken to implement the recommendations addressed to the Member State in the 2025 Rule of Law report, as well as developments with regard to the points raised in the respective country chapter of the 2025 Rule of Law Report and any other significant developments since January 2025 and up to the date of submission[3]. Please always include a link to and reference relevant legislation/documents (in the national language and/or where available, in English). **Significant developments** can include challenges, positive developments and best practices, covering both legislative developments or implementation and practices.

Information provided in reply to the first question under each pillar, related to the follow-up to the recommendations, does not need to be repeated in subsequent parts of the questionnaire, but can be cross-referenced in the subsequent questions, where relevant. All other questions are not limited to the recommendations, but as in previous years, cover the entire scope of the Report.

[3] Unless already covered in the input for the previous Rule of Law Reports.

Member State/enlargement country covered in contribution [only one choice possible]

If you wish to submit information concerning several Member States/enlargement countries, please fill in the questionnaire separately for each country. There is no limit to the number of contributions submitted by a single participant.

- ☐ Albania
- ☐ Austria
- ☐ Belgium
- ☐ Bulgaria
- ☐ Croatia
- ☐ Cyprus
- ☐ Czechia
- ☐ Denmark
- ☐ Estonia
- ☐ Finland

- ☐ France
- ☐ Germany
- ☐ Greece
- ☒ Hungary
- ☐ Ireland
- ☐ Italy
- ☐ Latvia
- ☐ Lithuania
- ☐ Luxembourg
- ☐ Malta
- ☐ Montenegro
- ☐ Netherlands
- ☐ North Macedonia
- ☐ Poland
- ☐ Portugal
- ☐ Romania
- ☐ Serbia
- ☐ Slovakia
- ☐ Slovenia
- ☐ Spain
- ☐ Sweden

I. Justice System

Please provide information on measures taken to follow-up on the recommendations received in the 2025 Report regarding the justice system (if applicable)

5000 character(s) maximum

A. Independence

Appointment and selection of judges, prosecutors and court presidents (incl. judicial review)

(The reference to 'judges' concerns judges at all level and types of courts as well as judges at constitutional courts)

5000 character(s) maximum

Irremovability of judges, including transfers, (incl. as part of judicial map reform), dismissal and retirement regime of judges, court presidents and prosecutors (incl. judicial review)

5000 character(s) maximum

Promotion of judges and prosecutors (incl. judicial review)

5000 character(s) maximum

Allocation of cases in courts

5000 character(s) maximum

Independence (including composition and nomination and dismissal of its members), and powers of the body tasked with safeguarding the independence of the judiciary (e. g. Council for the Judiciary)

5000 character(s) maximum

Accountability of judges and prosecutors, including disciplinary regime and bodies and ethical rules, judicial immunity and criminal/civil (where applicable) liability of judges (incl. judicial review)

5000 character(s) maximum

Independence/autonomy of the prosecution service

5000 character(s) maximum

Independence of the Bar (chamber/association of lawyers) and of lawyers

5000 character(s) maximum

Significant developments capable of affecting the perception that the general public has of the independence of the judiciary

5000 character(s) maximum

B. Quality of justice

(Under this topic, you are not required to give statistical information but should provide input on the type of information outlined in the introduction)

[single market relevance] Accessibility of courts (e.g. court/legal fees, legal aid, language)

5000 character(s) maximum

Resources of the judiciary (human/financial/material), remuneration/bonuses/rewards for judges and prosecutors, including observed changes (significant and targeted increase or decrease over the past year)

(Material resources refer e.g. to court buildings and other facilities. Financial resources include salaries of staff in courts and prosecution offices.)

5000 character(s) maximum

[single market relevance] Training of justice professionals (including judges, prosecutors, lawyers, court staff, clerks/trainees)

5000 character(s) maximum

Digitalisation (e.g. use of digital technology, including electronic communication and AI tools, within the justice system and with court users, procedural rules, access to judgments online)

5000 character(s) maximum

Use of assessment tools and standards (e.g. ICT systems, including AI-based systems, for case management, court statistics and their transparency, monitoring, evaluation, surveys among court users or legal professionals)

5000 character(s) maximum

Geographical distribution and number of courts/jurisdictions (“judicial map”) and their specialisation, in particular specific courts or chambers within courts to deal with fraud and corruption cases.

5000 character(s) maximum

[single market relevance] Specialisation (of judges/specific courts/chambers within courts) and training for the judiciary to deal with commercial cases, as well as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and mediation as regards commercial cases.

5000 character(s) maximum

C. Efficiency of the justice system

(Under this topic, you are not required to give statistical information but should provide input on the type of information outlined in the introduction)

[single market relevance] Developments related to efforts to improve the efficiency of the justice system (e.g. as regards length of proceedings, to address backlogs)

5000 character(s) maximum

Any other developments related to the justice system - please specify

5000 character(s) maximum

II. Anti-Corruption Framework

Where previous specific reports, published in the framework of the review under the UN Convention against Corruption, of GRECO, and of the OECD address the issues below, please make a reference to the points you wish to bring to the Commission's attention in these documents, indicating any relevant updates, changes or measures introduced that have occurred since these documents were published.

Please provide information on measures taken to follow-up on the recommendations received in the 2025 Report regarding the anti-corruption framework (if applicable):

5000 character(s) maximum

A. The institutional framework capacity to fight against corruption (prevention and investigation / prosecution)

List any **changes** as regards relevant authorities (e.g. national agencies, bodies) in charge of prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of corruption and the resources allocated to each of these authorities (the human, financial, legal, and technical/specialised resources as relevant), including the cooperation among domestic and with foreign authorities. Indicate any relevant measures taken to effectively and timely cooperate with OLAF and EPPO

5000 character(s) maximum

Safeguards for the functional independence of the authorities tasked with the prevention and detection of corruption

5000 character(s) maximum

Information on the implementation of measures foreseen in the strategic anti-corruption framework (if applicable). If available, please provide relevant objectives and indicators

5000 character(s) maximum

B. Prevention

Measures to enhance integrity in the public sector in particular as regards high-level officials (including as regards incompatibility rules, revolving doors, codes of conduct, ethics)

5000 character(s) maximum

Measures to enhance general transparency of public decision-making (including rules on lobbying, asset and interest disclosure rules, gifts policy, transparency of political party, financing)

5000 character(s) maximum

Measures to prevent conflicts of interest in the public sector. Please specify the features and scope of their application (e.g. categories of officials concerned, types of checks and corrective measures depending on the category of officials concerned)

5000 character(s) maximum

--> For the three previous points, **please also provide information and figures on their application/enforcement if available to you**, such as number of detected breaches/irregularities of the various rules in place and the follow-up given (investigations, sanctions, etc.)

Measures to ensure whistleblower protection and encourage reporting of corruption, including their application (i.e. number of reports received, and the follow-up given)

5000 character(s) maximum

[single market relevance] Specific measures to enhance transparency, integrity and accountability in sectors with high risks of corruption, with a view to monitor and prevent corruption and conflict of interests, and where applicable measures to prevent and address corruption committed by organised crime groups.

- *Such high-risk sectors could include: public procurement, including construction, transport/infrastructure, defence, cohesion, agriculture, environment, healthcare, investor residence schemes, large-scale investments of national interest and the spending of EU funds, urban planning.*
- *In particular, measures to mitigate high risks of corruption in the area of public procurement, such as enhancing transparency and oversight (for example through digital technologies) and promoting fair competition and accountability in public procurement (e.g. targeted actions to address the high share of single bids) and measures to guarantee the effective and independent functioning of the public procurement review bodies.*

5000 character(s) maximum

[single market relevance] Measures for the prevention of corruption in relation to the issuing of official permits (e.g. related to environment, energy, service provision and various types of construction)

5000 character(s) maximum

C. Repression

The legal framework on the criminalisation and sanctions for corruption and related offences, including foreign bribery

5000 character(s) maximum

Official data on the number of investigations, prosecutions, final judgments and the application of sanctions for corruption offences (differentiated by offence if possible). Please indicate whether the cases: involve legal persons; are related to the implementation of EU or national funds; involve high level corruption. Please indicate which data is publicly available and how policy-making is informed by the data

5000 character(s) maximum

Potential obstacles identified in law or in practice to the investigation and prosecution of high-level and complex corruption cases (e.g. political immunity regulation, procedural rules, statute of limitations, cross-border cooperation, pardoning)

5000 character(s) maximum

Information on effectiveness of criminal and non-criminal measures and of sanctions (e.g. recovery measures and administrative sanctions) on both public and private offenders

5000 character(s) maximum

Any other developments related to the anti-corruption framework - please specify

5000 character(s) maximum

III. Media pluralism and media freedom

Please provide information on measures taken to follow-up on the recommendations received in the 2025 Report regarding media pluralism and media freedom (if applicable)

5000 character(s) maximum

The Hungarian government has not complied with the recommendations contained in the 2025 Rule of Law Report. Similarly, it has not implemented the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) (Regulation (EU) 2024 /1083), which came into force on 8 August 2025, but no legislative or regulatory measures have been taken so far. In December 2025, the European Commission opened an infringement procedure against Hungary for failing to comply with several provisions under the EMFA and certain requirements under the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) (Directive (EU) 2018/1808).

The European Commission recommended to “introduce mechanisms to enhance the functional independence of the media regulatory authority taking into account European standards on the independence of media regulators”. There have not been any developments in this field since the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

The European Commission also recommended to “adopt measures to ensure fair and transparent distribution of advertising expenditure by the state and state-owned companies”. State advertising continues to distort the market and the entire Hungarian public sphere, with no change in this area. The transparency of state advertising has not improved either, even though this should have been changed since the EMFA came into force. Following a new public procurement tender, the National Communications Office concluded a new framework agreement in October 2025 again worth HUF 75 billion (€ 189 million). There is also an option for two extensions, so the actual value of the agreement is HUF 225 billion (€ 566 million).

Finally, the European Commission recommended to “strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance and editorial independence of public service media taking into account European standards on public service media”. There were no legislative or regulatory changes in 2025 in this regard either. In addition to disregarding the recommendations, Hungary fails to comply with the EMFA’s provisions on public service media.

The above-mentioned problem areas are also analysed in reports published by monitoring institutions like the International Press Institute or Mertek Media Monitor.

A. Media authorities and bodies

(Cf. Article 30 of Directive 2018/1808)

Measures taken to ensure the independence, enforcement powers and adequacy of resources (financial, human and technical) of media regulatory authorities and bodies

5000 character(s) maximum

The issues raised in our previous contributions to the Rule of Law Reports still prevail.

The National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH) is a convergent authority, which operates as regulator of the telecommunications and media markets within a single body. The Media Council is part of the NMHH; it has a distinct competence in the media field. The two bodies have the same president. The two-thirds majority held by the governing party in Parliament has control over both the NMHH and the Media Council. The Media Council's politically biased decision-making practices are well known. Among its other tasks, the Media Council investigates complaints regarding unbalanced reporting of public service media. This is indeed an important issue in Hungary. Republikon Institute and ConnectEurope analysed the balance of evening television news programs of public television between February and July 2025. The research found that the screen time allocation between pro-government and opposition politicians was 73% and 27% respectively, and while pro-government politicians were never presented in a negative context, opposition politicians were mostly presented in a negative tone. In 2025, the Media Council received a total of 59 complaints regarding the unbalanced reporting in public service media. In each case, the Media Council either did not initiate an administrative process or terminated it.

Based on EMFA, which entered into force on 8 August 2025, Member States have a legislative obligation affecting several areas. On the other hand, it imposes several tasks on national regulatory authorities and organisations and, in some instances, on different public administration bodies. Hungary and the national regulatory authorities and bodies have not fulfilled any of their obligations under EMFA at the time of the present contribution, and based on the available information, no preparatory work is currently underway.

Act CIV of 2023 on Certain Rules for Internet Broadcasting Services appointed the President of the NMHH as the Digital Services Coordinator in Hungary. This institution was established by the Digital Services Act to carry out the tasks of the Member States in supervising intermediary service providers, including online platforms and search services, and enforcing the European regulation. The independent Lakmusz-HDMO consortium (Hungarian member of the EDMO – European Digital Media Observatory) has experienced that the President of the NMHH is not cooperative. The Lakmusz-HDMO consortium organised workshops to discuss with the NMHH and co-regulators, among other things, the current problems of disinformation and the implementation of the European Union Code of Conduct on Disinformation. The first workshop in 2024 was particularly forward-looking, with the NMHH and the members of the Lakmusz-HDMO consortium having similar views. However, during the organisation of the second workshop, András Koltay, President of the NMHH, replied that “We have come to the decision that the NMHH can no longer participate in the workshops”. In 2025 three workshops were organized, but the NMHH did not attend these events. In this way, the Digital Service Coordinator is explicitly obstructing the implementation of the EU project for which he is responsible.

In 2025, the NMHH's budget was HUF 59.5 billion (€ 149.6 million). The Parliament approves the Media Council's budget as part of the NMHH's integrated budget. The Media Council's operating budget in 2025 was

HUF 736 million (€ 1.85 million). These amounts are theoretically suitable to guarantee high-level professional work, however, in the case of the NMHH and the Media Council these serve as the price of the loyalty.

Conditions and procedures for the appointment and dismissal of the head / members of the collegiate body of media regulatory authorities and bodies

5000 character(s) maximum

The framework for the appointment of the President of the NMHH and the Media Council (the media regulatory body of the NMHH) and other connected bodies has not changed.

The President of the NMHH and Media Council is appointed by the President of Hungary for nine years upon the proposal of the Prime Minister. Upon appointment, the President becomes the nominee for the presidency of the Media Council and is elected by the Parliament with a two-thirds supermajority for nine years; the Parliament's role is limited to a mere right to reject the nominee. Somewhat more substantive parliamentary control is present in the election of the four other members of the Media Council (each for nine years), which is based on the proposal of the Parliament's Cultural Committee, in which the two-thirds majority of the members are of the governing parliamentary group Fidesz-KDNP. However, this control is only formal due to the characteristics of the Hungarian political features, that is, due to the fact that the two-thirds majority is a monolithic political actor, where MPs vote along extreme party discipline.

It should be noted that although "[t]he appointment of the members of the Media Council and its chairman is subject to strict procedural and conflict of interest rules", these safeguards, in themselves, are necessary but not sufficient conditions of independence. Most important in this respect is the fact that the necessary two-thirds majority is held by a single, monolith political actor.

The Public Service Public Foundation's duty is to ensure the legislative requirements over the public service media. Its Board, the operating body, consists of six members elected by the Parliament (three nominated by the governing parties and three by the opposition parties, for nine years), the president of the Media Council, and another delegate of the Media Council. Membership ceases with conflict of interest, a dispensation (in case the person is undergoing conservatorship), or exclusion (if the person culpably fails to perform the role for more than six months, or if convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, or if professionally disqualified regarding the person's role in the Board or deprivation of civic rights). If a vacancy arises in the same parliamentary term or a different one with the same parliamentary composition, either the governing majority or the opposition which nominated the previous member has the right to nominate. From August 2022, if a vacancy arises in a different parliamentary term that changes the composition, the Parliament's Cultural Committee nominates, considering the changes. In both cases, after nomination, the Parliament elects the new members for a term lasting until the expiration of the other elected members' term. If the delegated president's or the delegated member's status ceases, the Media Council delegates another president/member in 15 days for a term lasting until the expiration of the other elected members' term. The current Public Service Media Foundation board members were elected in 2019 by the Parliament, with an additional member elected in 2021 as one of the former members died.

Existence and functions of media councils or other self-regulatory bodies

5000 character(s) maximum

The situation has remained almost unchanged since our previous contributions to the Rule of Law Reports. Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and on the Mass Media (hereafter: Media Law) created a co-regulation system as an alternative to the Media Council's control. The Media Law authorised media market players to set up co-regulatory bodies which have the authority – with exclusive jurisdiction – to implement rules relating to media content. The Media Law provides that the Media Council may conclude administrative agreements with the co-regulation bodies. Based on these agreements, the co-regulation body handles a specified range of cases within the official authority's jurisdiction and performs other functions relating to media administration and media policy. In this framework the responsibility of co-regulatory bodies is to decide upon complaints

concerning the activities of service providers, to arbitrate disputes between media enterprises and to monitor the activities of providers.

Four organisations have sprung up as part of the co-regulation framework since 2011: the Hungarian Newspaper Publishers' Association, the Association of Hungarian Content Providers, the Association of Hungarian Electronic Broadcasters and the Advertising Self-Regulatory Board.

The co-regulation system never really took off, however, and it was obvious that no one felt confident that it would be worthwhile to resort to this forum for settling disputed issues. The co-regulation procedure is not independent of the authorities since – based on the underlying legal agreement – the Media Council provides the co-regulatory bodies with financial support. Nor is it independent of the market, since the market players delegate members to serve on these bodies. Furthermore, the market players can also keep track of who lodged complaints against them. Hence, it was in no one's interest to launch such proceedings. The market players feel that it is better to keep the peace and avoid a scenario where they would have to delve into each other's disputes, and also that it would not be a good idea to alert the Media Council to problems. Civic organisations and citizens also do not report issues, either because they do not know the system or because they do not want to legitimise a regulatory practice in which the Media Council plays a role.

In assessing the effectiveness of the co-regulatory system, it is very telling that relevant pages on the websites of two industry organisations are blank or visibly incomplete. There is no indication that any kind of proceedings have been conducted in the case of the Association of Hungarian Content Providers and the Association of Hungarian Electronic Broadcasters. The Hungarian Newspaper Publishers' Association and the Advertising Self-Regulatory Board publish monitoring documents about certain issues.

The co-regulation system is a clear example of how an otherwise good, rule-of-law-compliant system in Hungary has become so empty that it is failing to fulfil its original purpose.

Self-regulatory bodies are weak and have limited role in the Hungarian media. The Association of Hungarian Journalists (MÚOSZ) is a journalists' organisation with long traditions, but the average age of members is quite high, and the organisation is not a very significant player in the Hungarian media field. A relatively new organisation (Médiaforum) was created as an association of independent media, but its viability is also limited. Independent local media outlets created their community (Fülke) to amplify the voices of local communities.

B. Safeguards against government or political interference and transparency and concentration of media ownership

[single market relevance] Measures taken to ensure the fair and transparent allocation of state advertising

5000 character(s) maximum

The issues raised in the previous Rule of Law Reports still prevail.

It is well documented that state advertisers favour pro-government companies and avoid independent media. This practice renders fair competition impossible and distorts the market. State sources finance politically favoured media outlets, and this helps several pro-government media enterprises to flourish, or at least survive the economically difficult years. These media companies are unquestionably loyal to the Government: the editorial practice has to serve the interest of the ruling parties if they want to preserve their most important revenue source. At the same time independent media outlets have become extremely vulnerable because of the unfair competition. The market-distortion effect of state advertising spending still prevails, therefore the publisher of Magyar Hang weekly with another Hungarian publisher filed a state aid complaint to the European Commission in April 2025.

The communication public procurement system is totally centralized. State institutions should conduct their communication activities, including state advertising, through the National Communications Office (NKOH). This means that public institutions, e.g. ministries, state-owned companies, and public institutions can only contract with media agencies that have previously won a public procurement tender and have concluded a

framework agreement with the NKOH. Since 2018 the NKOH has had a framework agreement only with the New Land Media and Lounge Design media agency consortium. These two agencies have the same owner, Gyula Balásy, a pro-government businessman. The obligated contracting authorities (public institutions) can enter into a contract with this one consortium, which can either be concluded after consultation or simply ordering the service. The contracting authority is obliged to base its award on the prices of a single tenderer. In fact, given the complexity of communication tasks, the pricing of individual tasks depends on the price that a single bidder quotes for a specific task.

So instead of encouraging the competition among the framework agreement partners, NKOH obliged all public institutions to contract with the Balásy-consortium. The consortium has a monopoly in state communication, and it has a price-setting role.

In the years 2022–2025 NKOH spent HUF 225 billion (€ 566 million) based on the framework agreement. The original value of the framework agreement was HUF 75 billion (€ 189 million), but it was extended twice for the same amount. Following a new public procurement tender, NKOH concluded a new framework agreement in October 2025 again worth HUF 75 billion. There is also an option for two extensions, so the actual value of the agreement is HUF 225 billion, as well as in the previous period.

NKOH is part of the Prime Minister's Cabinet Office and Antal Rogán, the head of the Cabinet Office is responsible for the NKOH. At the very beginning of 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Antal Rogán for his involvement in corruption in Hungary, based on the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. The announcement underlines that he controls NKOH and "(t)hroughout his tenure as a government official, Rogan has orchestrated Hungary's system for distributing public contracts and resources to cronies loyal to himself and the Fidesz political party". In April 2025 the U.S. State Department removed sanctions on Antal Rogán.

Since the EMFA came into force in August 2025, the transparency of state advertising should be ensured. However, no changes have been made in this area, and the Hungarian government has not taken any steps towards implementing the EMFA. Mertek Media Monitor sent a freedom of information request to the NKOH, asking about compliance with EMFA regulations in relation to state advertising. The NKOH did not provide a substantive response, stating that "due to its role as a central purchasing body, the NKOH does not participate in specific communication tasks, such as the implementation of advertising campaigns".

Safeguards against state / political interference, in particular:

- safeguards to ensure editorial independence of media (private and public)
- specific safeguards for the independence of heads of management and members of the governing boards of public service media (e.g. related to appointment, dismissal), safeguards for their financial and operational independence (e.g. related to reporting obligations and the allocation of resources) and safeguards for plurality of information and opinions
- **[single market relevance]** information on specific legal provisions and procedures applying to media service providers, including as regards granting /renewal/termination of licenses, company operation, capital entry requirements, concentration and corporate governance

5000 character(s) maximum

The issues raised in the previous Rule of Law Reports still prevail.

Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules of Media Content protects the independence of journalists in the following way: journalists are entitled to professional independence from the owner of the media content provider and from the person supporting the media content provider or placing a commercial announcement in the media content, as well as to protection against pressure from the owner or the person supporting the media content to influence the media content (editorial and journalistic freedom). A journalist cannot be penalised under employment law or any other legal penalty for refusing to comply with an order that would curtail their editorial and journalistic freedom. In practice, however, this rule has no practical significance and no journalist has ever taken legal action on this ground.

As also pointed out by previous Rule of Law Reports, there are serious governance and transparency problems around the public service media. The Hungarian public media operate in the framework of a very complex and confusing institutional structure. The Media Service Support and Asset Management Fund (hereafter: Fund) performs practically all of the public media's content acquisition and show production and it is also the legal employer of the public service media employees. At the same time, however, the editorial responsibility for the content lies with another organisation, the Duna Médiaszolgáltató Nonprofit Zrt. (hereafter: Duna).

According to the Media Law, Duna is the public service media provider and it is more or less appropriately subject to external control mechanisms (Board of the Public Service Public Foundation, Public Service Body, Public Service Fiscal Council), but in reality, the oversight is merely a façade since it has no resources. And then there is the Fund, which disposes of taxpayer funds without being subject to any meaningful independent control. The Fund is subject to the review of a single organisation: the Media Council. The budget of Duna for 2025 was HUF 2.44 billion (€ 6.1 million), while the budget of the Fund was HUF 165 billion (€ 415 million). This is obviously a hacking of public service media transparency requirements.

Article 5(2) of EMFA requires that the heads of the public service media provider be chosen through a transparent, open, efficient, and non-discriminatory process. The Hungarian Parliament must amend media law and detailed rules are necessary to ensure this process for selecting managers of public service media providers. EMFA has not been implemented, the required legislative changes have not been done. Mertek Media Monitor submitted a freedom of information request to the Ministry of Justice about legislative measures to implement Article 5(2) of EMFA. The Ministry responded in January 2026, and actually published an anti-EU political statement as a response. The Ministry stated that, in its opinion, certain provisions of the EMFA violate Hungary's sovereignty and therefore it has turned to the CJEU.

The radio frequency tenders of Media Council showed a more balanced practice in 2024, although the Media Council continued to support the expansion of Fidesz-affiliated radio stations. Based on the analysis of the Media Council's decisions, there were 35 radio frequency tenders in 2024; five of them were inconclusive. Out of the remaining 30 tenders, 16 frequencies were allocated to radio network operators close to the Government: 14 radio stations are part of networks owned by pro-government investors (Radio1, Radio7), two radios are owned by a church, and 14 frequencies were allocated to other operators. The 2025 analysis is not available yet.

[single market relevance] Transparency of media ownership and public availability of media ownership information, including on direct, indirect and beneficial owners

5000 character(s) maximum

The transparency of ownership is not the major problem in the Hungarian media system, but the transparency should be improved. The owners can be checked in the company registry, but no media-specific database is available.

In some cases, the beneficial owner is unknown. The best-known example of this is TV2, the market-leading commercial television broadcaster and one of the country's largest media companies. Investigative journalists have been trying to identify the beneficial owner for years, but this has not been possible due to the complex corporate structure. The increasingly widespread system of private equity funds and trust asset managers is conducive to concealing the beneficiary owner.

According to Article 22 of the EMFA Member States must establish substantive and procedural rules to evaluate concentrations in the media market that significantly affect media pluralism and editorial independence. In 2025 the Hungarian legislator had not yet established either the rules on notification or the criteria for notified mergers. This provision became especially relevant in October 2025, when a significant pro-government media company Indamedia Network acquired Ringier Hungary. Among other media brands the market leader tabloid newspaper Blikk and its online portal were involved in the acquisition.

Article 6 of the EMFA mainly imposes responsibilities on media service providers to ensure that users know the ownership backgrounds of their service providers and to identify and evaluate potential conflicts of interest.

Article 6(2) of EMFA trusts national regulatory authorities or other competent authorities with the development of national media ownership databases containing the relevant information of media ownership. In 2025 the Hungarian government did not implement EMFA and the ownership database was not created.

Ownership concentration is another major problem in Hungary.

Besides the Central European Press and Media Foundation (Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány, KESMA), several commercial media companies are owned by pro-government investors, like TV2 commercial television, Radio1 network, Index news portal and Blikk tabloid newspaper. The ruling party controls other elements of the media ecosystem, e.g. the media agency market, sales houses, printing facilities, distribution systems, and so on.

There are no real ownership constraints in the Hungarian media legislation, it is allowed to build a big media empire. The Media Law provides that the Hungarian Competition Authority (HCA) is obliged to obtain the position statement of the Media Council for the approval of the concentration of enterprises if the enterprises or the affiliates of two groups of companies bear editorial responsibility and their primary objective is to distribute media content to the general public via an electronic communications network or a printed media product. The official position statement of the Media Council shall bind the HCA. The Media Council shall not have the right to reject granting an official licence when the level of merger between independent opinion sources after the merger will ensure the right for diversity of information within the particular market segment for the media content service.

Until now the Media Council has issued reasoned opinions in only three of the seven cases, of which it granted regulatory clearance for the merger in one case. The most important feature of the technical content of the opinions is that they are unsubstantiated and inconsistent.

The Government has a possibility to avoid the investigation of the Media Council and the HCA. When KESMA was transformed into a media empire in 2018, the Prime Minister signed an order declaring the transactions to be a matter of “national strategic importance in the public interest”. This is a tool to avoid the investigation of authorities.

C. Framework for journalists' protection, transparency and access to documents

Rules and practices guaranteeing journalists' independence and safety, including as regards protection of journalistic sources and communications, referring also, if applicable, to follow-up given to alerts lodged with the Council of Europe's Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists

5000 character(s) maximum

Arguably the biggest threat to journalists' independence and safety in 2025 was the Russian-style Bill on the Transparency of Public Life, that, in fact, aimed to effectively and completely silence the remaining independent journalists (and civil society actors). Early spring in a public rally Prime Minister Viktor Orbán promised new measures against – among others – the media, with the pretext of protecting Hungary's sovereignty. A proposed bill was tabled in the Parliament in May, that would have authorized the Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) to blacklist organisations that had accepted foreign funds, and to prevent these organisations from receiving these

funds as well as the 1% donations from income tax. The announcement of the proposal was followed by protests, where tens of thousands demanded the revocation of the proposed bill. Although surprisingly the governing party backed down and the adoption of the bill was postponed and it was not put on the Parliament's agenda in the fall term, it remains formally pending. The proposal arguably exercised – and, since it was just postponed, but not dropped has been exercising – some chilling effect, creating an uncertain situation for journalists.

Although the bill was postponed for the time being, the narrative of foreign-funded journalists threatening national sovereignty remained. In June 2025 the SPO launched a smear campaign against Válasz Online and journalist Szabolcs Vörös, who made an interview with Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelensky. In a publication available online till today, the SPO alleged that Válasz Online could make and publish the interview just because it is part of the “Ukrainian propaganda machinery”. Válasz Online subsequently sued the SPO for defamation, the legal proceedings are still ongoing.

The SPO launched an attack against investigative journal site Átlátszó. In its “investigative report” published in 2024 the SPO accused Átlátszó inter alia of engaging in spying activity, being member of an international network intervening against the interests of Hungary. Átlátszó initiated civil proceedings and won in the first instance; the Metropolitan Regional Court held that these were false statements and that the SPO needed to pay damages to Átlátszó.

The Bill on the Transparency of Public Life can be considered as a general threat to journalist's independence and safety, but also some singular cases occurred that are highlighted below.

At the end of January 2025, Telex journalists Dániel Simor and Noémi Gombos tried to ask the Prime Minister questions on healthcare near a film studio in the town Fót. The journalists' accreditation was withdrawn, officers of the Counter Terrorism Centre (TEK) arrived and asked them to leave, and when they refused to do so, they were detained, and Dávid Simor was fined under misdemeanour charges.

There are irregularities regarding government press conferences. In April 2025, spokesperson Eszter Vitályos noted to Miklós Gergely Nagy, journalist of news outlet 24.hu, that she expects someone else from the outlet as she found the journalist's style of questioning reprehensible. 24.hu rejected the request, and sent Nagy to the next press conference, where he was denied entry. Specific journalists or media outlets are still being banned from government press conferences.

In 2024 the Constitution Protection Office interrogated Magyar Hang's journalist Tamás Koncz, editor Lukács Csaba and editor-in-chief György Zsombor; polygraph tests were used. In early January 2025 a question was submitted about this to the European Commission by Members of the European Parliament. The Commission answered that it was aware of the case and referred to the European Media Freedom Act that was going to be applicable from 8 August 2025, prescribing safeguards for journalists in similar situations.

Law enforcement capacity, including during protests and demonstrations, to ensure journalists' safety and to investigate attacks on journalists

5000 character(s) maximum

There is still no dedicated law enforcement capacity to prevent or investigate attacks on journalists, and neither criminal law nor law enforcement practice treats journalists as a group that requires enhanced protection. Indeed, journalists are not threatened physically by third parties, rather, their work is most often hindered by state actors (see for example Dániel Simor's and Noémi Gombos' case above). Journalists were rarely attacked during protests and demonstrations in 2025. An exception was an incident against journalists of anti-government media Kontroll, where a single individual attacked the journalists, and seized the microphone. The individual was later taken into custody by the police. Another exception was when the reporter of the public media was threatened verbally to be hung. Fidesz MP Gyula Budai reported the case to the police, and a criminal investigation was initiated.

Distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks occur, however, as we noted in our previous contribution as well. We do not know of any special protection provided by the state to media outlets against such attacks.

Access to information and public documents by public at large and journalists (incl. transparency authorities where they exist, procedures, costs/fees, timeframes, administrative/judicial review of decisions, execution of decisions by public authorities, possible obstacles related to the classification of information)

5000 character(s) maximum

The general problems noted in our previous contribution still prevail. Access to data regarding public funds remains restricted based on the constitutional amendment that narrowed down the definition of public funds. The Parliament is still in failure to comply with the legislative duty ordered in a 2020 Constitutional Court decision that set a due date of 31 December 2020 to amend the Act of Parliament regulating freedom of information (FOI) procedures since the current law does not guarantee judicial remedy in case public information is not held by a public authority but by an organisation which entered into financial relations with a public body. Currently, this omission results in the lack of legal remedies for those requesting such public data, as courts dismiss these cases without examining the case on the merits. The Constitutional Court rejected complaints invoking the lawmaker's omission.

Also, the legal amendments noted in our previous contributions "overcodifying" certain decisions and therefore barring journalists from obtaining public data were not undone. Please note that other irregularities are detailed under Question II.15. of this contribution.

The Constitutional Court rejected a complaint without examining the merits regarding a case K-Monitor initiated against the Ministry of Interior to obtain a report on the reform of the healthcare system. The court held that it found no factor establishing that the case would constitute a constitutionally relevant question or unconstitutionality affecting decisions of the lower courts.

Access to information was severely restricted by a decision of the Constitutional Court. A journalist required data regarding the construction of the Budapest–Belgrád railway. The data – that is connected to the spending of HUF 700 billion (€ 1.8 billion) – was withheld as a result of the decision of Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, without any reasoning. Independent newspaper hvg.hu and journalist Babett Orosz initiated court proceedings. The Constitutional Court held that access to public data can be denied based on reasons related to foreign policy, and in such case courts can only examine whether the exception was based on an Act of the Parliament; and that the responsible minister gave the statement related to the denial. That is, the courts cannot examine such denials substantively, only the formal criteria. This is arguably a not necessary and proportionate restriction of the fundamental right of access to information, also, it questions whether the right to appeal prevails. The case law followed suit: a few months later access to data was denied on similar grounds, without meaningful reasoning in a case related to data on a military mission in Chad.

Two controversial decisions of the Kúria are to be mentioned. One of the cases concerned the controversial "VIP department" of the state hospital Uzsoky. Transparency International Hungary requested data covering inter alia the invoices, the Kúria, however, overturning the previous judgements awarded in the case concerned, found without previously assessing the requested document that invoices issued by a state owned hospital of services to private patients dispatched by an intermediary company cannot be accessed even if personal data are erased of the invoices, because such invoices may residually contain information that allows the identification of the patients. This contradicts previous judgments by the Kúria, which expect courts to assess the document sought prior to ruling. The other case concerned non-transparent government resolutions requested by Transparency International Hungary. The Kúria, overturning the judgment by the appeals court, ruled that the rejection of requests to access large data sets may not be challenged in a single lawsuit, instead, separate claims shall be submitted in separate lawsuits regarding each and every element of the dataset sought for. Following this decision it will be more difficult to request larger sets of data and to enforce access to them before the courts.

Lawsuits (incl. SLAPPs - strategic lawsuits against public participation) and convictions against journalists (incl. defamation cases) and measures taken to safeguard against manifestly unfounded and abusive lawsuits

5000 character(s) maximum

As defamation was decriminalized in 2023, numbers of such charges against journalists have dropped significantly. However, other lawsuits, most notably GDPR-based SLAPPs remained a viable option for those seeking to silence journalists.

GDPR-based strategic lawsuits remained a persistent tool for suppressing investigative journalism in Hungary throughout 2025 alongside other legal tools, such as press rectification procedures. Politically connected individuals continued exploiting data protection provisions to prevent reporting on their business activities that were backed partially by government funds, or on their other political gains, burdening media outlets with costly legal challenges despite the public interest nature of their work. Without a dedicated journalistic exemption in Hungary's GDPR implementation, authorities retained broad discretion in balancing privacy and press freedom. However some progressive rulings from the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information and the Kúria suggest potential improvement still in the lack of a legislation.

According to a FOI request the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU) has filed to the Ministry of Justice, no progress has been made in Hungary regarding the implementation of the Anti-SLAPP Directive. As a sign-off, the Ministry of Justice noted: "We would also like to inform you that, unlike in other countries, journalists in Hungary have no reason to be afraid."

Meanwhile, multiple newsrooms were facing SLAPP lawsuits in 2025, many of which went unreported.

Győző Orbán, the father of the Prime Minister of Hungary, initiated proceedings before the Data Protection Authority (DPA) against an MP and five independent media outlets for the alleged unlawful processing of personal data, claiming invasion of his privacy as he is not a public figure. One of the media outlets, Gulyáságyú Média, published an article with aerial footage about the Hatvanpuszta estate owned by Győző Orbán.

Development of the estate began in 2010, when Viktor Orbán first took office, and has since grown into an investment worth several billion forints (tens of millions of euros). According to the owner's public statements, it is being developed as a "family farm"; however, the financial background of the project remains unclear. Traces show links to Lőrinc Mészáros, close friend of Viktor Orbán who became one of Hungary's wealthiest persons. In addition, Győző Orbán's company, which allegedly provides for the construction, has won significant public procurement grants in the last decade. The construction has been carried out entirely away from public scrutiny. Gulyáságyú Media reported on the matter and now faces a SLAPP lawsuit.

Gyula Balásy, the principal contractor behind the Government's propaganda campaigns, was the subject of a planned Magyar Hang article investigating whether public money could have funded his costly personal construction project indirectly in the Buda district. In response to the journalist's preliminary questions, the newspaper received a demand letter threatening a personal-rights lawsuit and a data-protection authority investigation. The newsroom published the article nevertheless, though the threat of a lawsuit remains.

The Barabás family, one of Hungary's wealthiest families, continued to initiate lawsuits against Forbes' annual wealth lists and articles publishing on the outcome of the proceedings between the family and Forbes. The new proceedings include appeals against court decisions made in 2024 regarding press rectification and a preliminary injunction. They include new press rectification procedures, DPA procedures and civil lawsuits based on personality rights. Forbes received right of access requests regarding each of the articles they planned to publish.

Alongside Forbes, the family has sent a demand letter to the HCLU representing Forbes in the SLAPP proceedings, after they reported on the positive rulings of the courts in their cases and posted a video which raises awareness on the effect of SLAPPs against journalists. The demand letter threatened to sue the watchdog organisation for HUF 10 million (approximately € 25.000) in pecuniary damages. As Forbes reposted this video when they reported on the successful court ruling, they received the same demand letter at the same time. The owners of the company proceeded until now solely with suing the watchdog organisation protecting journalists.

In 2025, the courts made two significant rulings regarding the balancing of freedom of the press with the right to personal data, which are significant in the pushback against SLAPPs, as mainly the GDPR is used for such lawsuits. These rulings show courts increasingly safeguarding freedom of the press. However, the lack of legislation and action from the Government means the progress is slow and was achieved after ongoing litigation since the implementation of the GDPR.

Any other developments related to media pluralism and freedom - please specify

5000 character(s) maximum

The discontinuation of political advertising on Google and Meta in fall 2025 severely affected government communications, even before the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA) regulation came into effect. These ads were previously an important tool for disseminating government messages, which often included disinformation and hostile narratives.

During the first nine months of 2025, before Google and Meta banned political ads, government-affiliated actors, including government agencies, Fidesz politicians, government-organized media, and proxy organisations, paid for 87% of the HUF 4.1 billion (approximately € 10.6 million) spent on Google and Meta ads in Hungary. The remaining 13% was shared by all other actors, including all opposition parties, NGOs, and independent media.

Despite bans by Google and Meta, political ads – including seemingly harmless cartoons and hardcore deepfakes placed by pro-government advertisers – have continued to run on both tech giants' platforms, though in significantly smaller quantities. Often, the ads are simply reclassified in other categories, such as Business, Finance, Autos, or Internet.

As in previous years, Hungary was unique among the countries of the European Union in 2025 in that government-controlled media outlets and their social media pages were the primary sources of fake news and conspiracy theories. The main targets of these disinformation campaigns were European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelensky, EPP President Manfred Weber, and Péter Magyar, president of the TISZA party and Viktor Orbán's challenger in the upcoming elections. According to disinformation spread by the Government, "war-mongering Brussels" intends to interfere in the 2026 Hungarian elections to install a "puppet government" that supports Ukraine through Magyar and his party. In contrast, the governing party's main campaign message is that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is the guarantor of peace and the only one who can protect the country from war. The Government used AI-generated content to support these claims. By the end of 2025, the entire Hungarian county newspaper network and the daily newspaper Magyar Nemzet, both of which are controlled by the governing party, were coordinating the distribution of AI-generated fake images of Magyar to link him to the war and "Brussels warmongers". Moreover, the governing party spread false information about the TISZA party's alleged plans to increase taxes with enormous resources, based on an AI-generated document. Meanwhile, a court of first instance ruled that the pro-government media outlet Index, which originally published the documents, had falsely claimed they were linked to the opposition party. In another case, a court issued an interim order prohibiting the distribution of a free special edition of the pro-government tabloid Bors, which aimed to widely disseminate the false information. However, the governing party interpreted the court's ban on disseminating blatant lies as a restriction on freedom of speech.

IV. Other institutional issues related to checks and balances

Please provide information on measures taken to follow-up on the recommendations received in the 2025 Report regarding the system of checks and balances (if applicable)

5000 character(s) maximum

A. The process for preparing, enacting and implementing laws

[single market relevance] Framework, policy and use of impact assessments and evidence based policy-making, stakeholders'*/public consultations (including rules and practices on the transparent participation of civil society to policy development and decision-making processes), and transparency and quality of the legislative process in the preparatory, the parliamentary and implementation phase (including guidance on how to implement legislation)

** This includes also the consultation of social partners*

5000 character(s) maximum

[single market relevance] Rules and use of fast-track procedures and emergency procedures (for example, the percentage of decisions adopted through emergency /urgent procedure compared to the total number of adopted decisions)

5000 character(s) maximum

[single market relevance] Safeguards to ensure legal certainty, the stability of the legal framework and non-discrimination.

5000 character(s) maximum

Rules and application of states of emergency (or analogous regimes), including judicial review and parliamentary oversight

5000 character(s) maximum

Regime for constitutional review of laws

5000 character(s) maximum

B. Independent authorities

Independence, resources, capacity and powers (including effective access to relevant data) of national human rights institutions ('NHRIs'), of ombudsman institutions if different from NHRIs, of equality bodies if different from NHRIs and of supreme audit institutions

(Cf. the website of the European Court of Auditors: <https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/SupremeAuditInstitutions.aspx#>)

5000 character(s) maximum

Statistics/reports concerning the follow-up to recommendations by National Human Rights Institutions, ombudsman institutions, equality bodies and supreme audit institutions in the past year

5000 character(s) maximum

[single market relevance] Safeguards to ensure the effective independence of supervisory and regulatory authorities with a direct impact on economic operators such as national economic oversight, enforcement and competition authorities

C. Accessibility and judicial review of administrative decisions

[single market relevance] Transparency of administrative decisions and sanctions (incl. their publication and rules on collection of related data) and respect of the good administration principle (including the obligation of the administration to give reasons for decisions)

5000 character(s) maximum

[single market relevance] Judicial review of administrative decisions: short description of the general regime (in particular competent court, scope, suspensive effect, interim measures, and any applicable specific rules or derogations from the general regime of judicial review)

5000 character(s) maximum

[single market relevance] Safeguards (other than judicial review) regarding decisions or inaction of administrative authorities, including remedies (e.g. administrative review)

5000 character(s) maximum

[single market relevance] Rules and practices related to the application by all courts, including constitutional jurisdictions, of the preliminary ruling procedure (Art. 267 TFEU)

5000 character(s) maximum

[single market relevance] Implementation of final judgments by the public administration and State institutions and follow-up given to supranational judgments, including decisions from the European Court of Human Rights, as well as available remedies in case of non-implementation

5000 character(s) maximum

Oversight, including by courts, of the use of intrusive surveillance software by national authorities

5000 character(s) maximum

D. The enabling framework for civil society

Measures regarding the framework for civil society organisations and human rights defenders (e.g. legal framework and its application in practice incl. registration, transparency and dissolution rules)

5000 character(s) maximum

Rules and practices having an impact on the effective operation and safety of civil society organisations and human rights defenders. This includes measures to protect them from attacks – verbal, physical or on-line –, intimidation, legal threats incl. SLAPPs, negative narratives or smear campaigns, measures capable of affecting the public perception of civil society organisations, etc. It also includes measures to monitor threats or attacks and dedicated support services, as well as available remedies

5000 character(s) maximum

Organisation of financial support for civil society organisations and human rights defenders (e.g. framework to ensure access to funding, and for financial viability, taxation/incentive/donation systems, measures to ensure a fair distribution of funding)

5000 character(s) maximum

E. Initiatives to foster a rule of law culture

If there have been developments related to initiatives to foster a rule of law culture, please specify, which (e.g. debates in national parliaments on the rule of law, public information campaigns on rule of law issues, contributions from civil society, education initiatives, etc.)

5000 character(s) maximum

Any other developments related to the system of checks and balances - please specify

5000 character(s) maximum

Cross-pillar elements: cross-border rule of law issues related to the Single Market

If there are any significant challenges concerning the Single Market you have been facing in a cross-border context relating to any of the four pillars of the report, including for example issues with market access and the conditions for economic activities, that you would like to highlight, please do so here.

Given the cross-cutting nature of this question, it is included as a separate section in the questionnaire. Information collected under this question will however be integrated under the relevant existing pillar(s) of the Report.

5000 character(s) maximum

Supporting document upload

If you would like to submit any supporting document(s) to your contribution, please upload your file(s) here

Contact

rule-of-law-network@ec.europa.eu